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Summary
The paper encircles the subjectivity of drug taking as
one form of contemporary practice in which funda-
mental theoretical issues are dealt with. In particular,
following Mariana Valverde’s genealogy of alcohol
regulation (Valverde, 1998), the question of the free
will, and the paradox of the simultaneous being and
non-being of the autonomous subject, are viewed as
present in various approaches to drugs. The current
neo-pragmatist wave substitutes low-key practical
notions of habits for a dichotomy of free will or deter-
minism. The concept of objectification promises to
overcome that dichotomy by externalizing it; in terms
of this concept, we can distinguish the abstract-imag-
ined ‘fix’ from a genuinely transforming realization,
and suggest that ours is the age of the fix, of instru-
mental commodities that change us in ways we do not
intend. But, it is claimed, an inescapable issue of the
self-dissolution of the subject remains; perhaps in the
definitive shape of a suicide, or in the minor shapes of
fixes such as a tactics of feigned surrender, New Age
Higher Powers, or imagined communities.
Determined to realize the idea of a benevolent surren-
der of the subject, the paper ends in an attempt to con-
tribute to the coming to an understanding of herself
and with herself of a person who finds herself at the
troublesome intersection of Narcotics Anonymous
and a social work development network of
Copenhagen City called Wild Learning. 
En-trance
To be, or not to be: that is the question: 
Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
And by opposing end them? To die: to sleep;
No more; and by a sleep to say we end
The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to, ‘tis a consummation
Devoutly to be wish’d. To die, to sleep;
To sleep: perchance to dream: ay, there’s the rub;
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come?
Shakespeare: Hamlet
In that most famous line in drama history
Shakespeare definitely misunderstands him-
self: the question is, in fact, to be and not to
be. What Hamlet really speculates, is that it’s
our paradoxical fear of the dreams we might
dream when we are no more that prevents us
from wishing to die. “Thus conscience does
make cowards of us all”, he claims. For con-
science seems to be that by which we can be
when we are not: that religious phenomenon
which we can project into that “undiscover’d
country from whose bourn no traveller re-
turns”.
The ease with which religion stretches
ethics beyond death has certainly diminished
since Shakespeare, at least in the quarters of
the modern world into which the networks of
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Outlines reach. But the fundamental paradox
inherent in Hamlet’s speculations on the pos-
itive qualities of non-being, the activity of
rest, and the cowardice of conscience, must
not rely on religion to express itself. This pa-
per sets out to explore the subjectivity of drug
taking starting from the idea that the same
paradox permeates the ways we deal with
ourselves when we deal with drugs; that drug
taking, for better and for worse, holds or sets
in motion the contradiction of the subject’s
self-cancellation (and possible reemer-
gence).
If religion plays a subordinate part in my
argument, it is not because ethnographic re-
ports of interactions between drug-taking and
religious experience (interactions more in-
tense than the case of the Christian consum-
mation of Jesus’ blood as wine) have cap-
tured my theoretical imagination. Rather, it is
because if we assume that drugs are being
substituted for religion as a collective tech-
nology of ourselves with which we tackle the
paradoxes of being and non-being – and per-
haps even with comparably gloomy implica-
tions –, then a veritable mountain of refer-
ences can help us transform and understand
ourselves in this respect, as producers, users,
objects, regulators, victims, abstainers – in
short, as subjects, of drugs. 
I picture myself at the foot of that moun-
tain of references drawing only a hazy out-
line of just a few of its ridges and summits
before entering the murky caverns of drugs
discourses and practices. With the shape of
one obvious peak reversed on my retina, I
bow my head and strike the first match with
the exclamation: Opium is the religion of the
people!1
A Timely Prescription
But what am I doing? Running away into
misty obscurity with a half-baked fragment
of thought turned upside-down? Of course, it
may be sighed, such a reversal is what one
should expect from a psychologist ambition-
ing to grapple with big-time philosophical
terms like being and non-being. OK, then,
here is my excuse: it is precisely in the hope
that such reversals may turn out productive
that the Health, Humanity and Culture group
over the years have arranged cross-discipli-
nary discussions such as the seminar on
Drugs, Health and Subjectivity which occa-
sioned this paper. The assumption – argued
by Jensen (1999) under the call for a ‘philos-
ophy just-in-time’ – is that philosophical is-
sues and categories are worked and reworked
in the ‘smaller texts’ of scientific as well as
lay practice, so that, whether we like it or not,
we are stuck with each other in activities
which are philosophy, science, and everyday
life at one and the same time; and whether we
recognize it or not, we are assuming stand-
points in practical affairs while transforming
philosophical categories and vice versa.
Insofar, it may be as justified for me to con-
tinue the psychological tradition of amateur
philosophizing as it was for Marx to spend
the second half of his philosophical career
doing political economy2.
And further justification is close at hand.
Mariana Valverde’s excellent contribution to
that same seminar, and to our journal
(Valverde, 2002), in what I consider to be
very much the same vein as Jensen3, takes up
the age-old philosophical issue of truth-
telling as ethics and lets us realize how it is
1 “Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the
expression of real suffering and a protest against real suf-
fering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the
heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless condi-
tions. It is the opium of the people.” (Marx, 1970, 1)
2 Another route to understanding this phenomenon of
‘philosophizing’ is through a reception of Gramsci and
Brecht, see (Haug, 1980).
3 That is, not in the hope of guiding or being guided to a
land of freedom, but in “the desire to understand just what
we, in our specific historical moment, are doing.” (Val-
verde, 1998, 21) 
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performed and transformed in the myriad of
small texts devoted to the small-scale authen-
ticity of today’s more or less ‘intoxicated au-
tobiographies’. Similarly, what made us keen
on inviting Valverde in the first place was her
illuminating work on how the question of the
free will – no less! – was reworked, not only
in pragmatist and Foucauldian philosophies
on habits and governance, but in the legal and
scientific discourses, practices and regula-
tions on alcohol throughout the 20th century
(Valverde, 1998).
So: I won’t yield in the face of the big is-
sues, and we will encounter death, religion,
and other monsters below, including even
Marx’ “sigh of the oppressed creature”, don’t
worry!
Still, it appears safer to take off from a
point closer to home. Valverde’s theme of the
free will may serve as a bridge between the
paradox of being and non-being and the psy-
chological issues connected with drugs. Even
if the concept of ‘will’, and thus, the intrigu-
ing contradiction in a notion of ‘diseases of
the will’, seems quite remote from psycho-
logical discourse, much the same problemat-
ic pops up in various (medical and) psycho-
logical guises, not only in theoretical con-
cepts such as ‘motivation’, ‘self-efficacy’,
‘ego-strength’, or ‘conation’, but also in
practical clinical questions of ‘compliance’,
‘relapse’, ‘readiness for change’, etc. – and,
of course, above all, in the scientific or semi-
scientific conceptualizations of drug misuse
as ‘dependence’/’dependency’, as well as in
related diagnostic concepts such as ‘psy-
chopathy’, etc. There is ample material to be-
gin with in psychology and in the discourse
of drug misuse.
The Pragmatics of Human
Indulgence
But the obvious classic when it comes to
paradoxes of subjectivity, willpower and
drugs in psychological practice is an anthro-
pologist: Gregory Bateson’s famous analysis
of alcoholism and the ‘cybernetics of self’
(Bateson, 1972).  Bateson restates the ideolo-
gy of the Alcoholics Anonymous as the de-
ployment of an absolute dualism of will and
determination. The paradox of choosing to
surrender to fate, to “a power greater than
ourselves” (and the idea of that power itself
containing another paradox, the notion of
“God as we – each! – understand him”) is of-
fered to counter the epistemological flaw of
western man’s belief in himself as the cause
of events that leads him to a futile battle
against forces which he does not realize to be
also himself.
Bateson’s rendering tended to oscillate be-
tween, on the one hand, alcoholism as a great
curse of humankind, and AA as striking a
fundamental epistemological chord and, on
the other hand, alcoholism as a psychiatric
disease, the etiology of which may now be
explained in terms of communications theo-
ry, and AA as providing the suitable cure. A
generation later, the ethnographic debate has
shifted its focus to a slightly different pair of
opposites – less foundation-seeking and far-
reaching, and much more resistant to any
trembling effected by deep contradictions.
The choice now appears to be one of identity
or habit.
Valverde’s interpretation (Valverde, 1998)
is written as an alternative to the by now con-
ventional wisdom that AA and other self-help
organizations primarily provide identity
through collective narratives (Rappaport,
1994; 2000) or rites de passage (Steffen,
1993). Instead, Valverde stresses the prag-
matic and small-time technologies of the self
provided in the organization by mundane
routines, proverbs, rules, etc. Valverde does
not, however, as might be expected, only
construe what goes on in the AA in the con-
temporary Foucauldian vein as ethical work.
She also appears to leap out of today’s dis-
courses by referring to the classic philosophi-
cal theme of determinism/voluntarism and
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introducing early American pragmatism in
the shape of the notion of ‘habit’ suggested
by William James (James, 1950) and John
Dewey as something that may mediate or at
least soften that dichotomy by being in-be-
tween and both one and the other. All the
same, Valverde’s intervention remains a ‘phi-
losophy just-in-time’. The difficult question,
then, is just how it intervenes in our practical
affairs; does it reproduce or does it transform
our understandings, or both? 
Both identity politics and pragmatics are
sides of today’s drugs discourse, and they
may even be combined. Consider the curious
example of a Danish academic who in the
80’s and the early 90’s wrote two brilliant so-
cial constructionist histories of drug misuse
as a social problem and of surveys about the
problem (Winsløw, 1984; 1991). Recently,
he announced that he had been on drugs
when he wrote the books, until he joined a
Minnesota treatment facility. But, at least on
the face of it, the essentialist belief in the ob-
jectivity of disease is absolutely pivotal to
that treatment method. So, we asked him at a
seminar at our Department, had he made a U-
turn? No, he replied, he had merely found
that the disease model worked for him….
Such a fashionably ironic and ‘postmod-
ern’, pragmatic-to-the-point-of-shamelessly-
self-contradictory approach to knowledge
and to one-self is perhaps not quite at a par
with all contemporary ethnographic interpre-
tations of AA; but it may provide an image of
the way subjectivity is conceptualized at both
ends of that specter. When the self and its
ethics is reduced to its various, even local, so-
cial or cultural categories, as in the notions of
identity, identity work, technologies of the
self, etc., a pragmatics of identity is near at
hand. These are the categories of what we
can sensibly persuade ourselves to take our-
selves to be.
And why not? Is there any reason to be-
lieve that the grand identity narratives of Mo-
dernity, with its silent norms and its well-de-
scribed deviant Others, should be of any
more a help to our dealing with drugs and ad-
dictions? Or that the strive for ‘authenticity’
so classic in ‘intoxicated autobiographies’
(Valverde, 2002) should be trusted to tran-
scend the level of what may usefully be de-
ployed as technique? In fact, if the conserva-
tive ‘war on drugs’ policy has been contrary
to welfare or social approaches to addiction,
it can also be considered their mirror image
companion in the passionate fights over
world-views and identities, just as, in practi-
cal terms, the penal and social institutions
have supplemented at least as much as con-
trasted each other. The problem, then, is not
in terms of which image of Humanity we
should chase, cure, and correct the addicts,
but whether that is a humane use of such im-
ages in the first place.
This line of argument would support the
current move towards ‘harm reduction’ poli-
cies as the only way to really transcend the
deadlocks into which drugs interventions
have been enticed.
The pragmatics of harm reduction fits well
with an equally modest view of the past and a
minimalist approach to causality. Surely, if
the addict can be taught to approach himself
pragmatically, as the learner, user and object
of tricks, tips, proverbs and mottos, and as
the both detached and indulged self trying
identity categories on for size, it makes sense
to assume that this is only because that is
what he was like all the time. And that, thus,
the taking of drugs itself can be recounted in
a pragmatic tone. Rather than construing a
deep pathogenic biography in terms of orga-
nized crime, social exclusion, family struc-
ture or emotional strains – for a psychothera-
pist or police detective to dig out and chal-
lenge – we may then see the road to drugs ini-
tiation more profanely as contingent instru-
mental hedonism.
This is the explicit anti-war-on-drugs mes-
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sage in a recent well-founded publication,
even as it reports an almost epidemic spread
in juvenile drug use in Britain:
“As we have shown drugs initiation can occur at
any stage of adolescence depending on a variety
of factors, from availability to the impact of
friendship networks, to the contingencies of a
particular social scene most notably, at around
age 17, being part of serious nights out in town,
going out with friends in party mode. This com-
plexity and dynamism, plus the rational, con-
sumerist, hedonistic approach to decision making
by young people are still processes which are
rarely grasped in public debates about ‘prevent-
ing’ people taking drugs”, (Parker, Aldridge, &
Eggington, 2001, 78).
In texts such as this, we are persuaded into a
kind of no-nonsense approach that will,
hopefully, replace the ideological meta-
physics of prevention, let alone of the ‘war
on drugs’. 
The mentioning of consumerism strikes a
generalizing chord. The consumer is you and
me and everybody, and is easily identifiable
as such. The familiarity of that concept im-
plies that the drug taker is not after all a dia-
bolic deviant, and that the ways in which his
hedonistic indulgence both praises and de-
nies his subjective will are as common as any
commodity. The idea of the consumer, like
that of habit, hits somewhere between subject
and object, and stages a relation between
them; the consumer adjusts his preferences to
situational contingencies in order to obtain
an effect, affecting himself as an object –
emerging as a subject insofar as he makes of
himself an object.
This is the approach of Gomart & Hennion
(1999), writing from an ‘actor-network-theo-
ry’ perspective which in a different way lies
close to pragmatism. Gomart & Hennion
share the intention of getting beyond the di-
chotomy of subject and object, and they point
a perhaps slightly more radical way out of
that trap, attacking the very idea of the sub-
ject in action theories. They describe how a
drug user, just as well as a music amateur,
may be in fact be emerging as a contingent
subject in the process of actively submitting
himself to a set of constraints and passions.
“Drugs, like music (or love, or wine tasting…)
throw the user neither into social construction
and ‘pure’ ritual nor into chemistry or aesthetics
(the mechanical effects of drugs or musical pieces
themselves). Skilled gestures and techniques of
the body, appropriate dispositions of the mind,
obsessive tidiness in installation, organizational
control of time and space, quasi-scientific exper-
tise of the objects involved and adeptness in man-
aging their passion as a collective construction of
a ‘connoisseur’s’ practice …these practical and
social modalities are necessary but do not work
by themselves. Our descriptions, observations,
and interviews constantly reveal a subtle inter-
weaving between being abandoned to an external
power and the virtuosity of practices, of manual,
and of social skills. The user passes between ac-
tive and passive. That is, between ‘I am manipu-
lated’ (because I agree to it) and ‘I manipulate’
(an object which is stronger than myself).”
(Gomart & Hennion, 1999, 243)
Gomart & Hennion take the ethnographers’
typically a-normative stance towards drug
use, achieving Verfremdung by rendering that
chocking deviance mundane and everyday,
implying that even if subjectivity is tem-
porarily cancelled, we should not be alarmed
since this is what any music amateur is doing
on a daily basis. In that sense, they too take
the low-key pragmatic route. But they devi-
ate: with the epistemological radicalism of
the actor-network theory, they take us away
from smooth middle terms right back into the
paradoxes of subjectivity and objectivity.
And instead of resorting, as do others, to the
kind of neo-positivism which shoves the
problem (and the subject) out of sight by de-
claring all things to be simply semiotic fac-
tors (‘actants’) in the production of ‘events’ –
the so-called generalized principle of sym-
metry – they refer to the dialectics of objecti-
fication and subjectification. Semiotics, as it
were, is their scaffold, not their cage:
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“Semiotics makes it possible to describe the emer-
gence of an effect by referring not to agents but to
‘that which lets/makes happen’ (ce qui fait faire
(…)). For semioticians, this that which is the pred-
icate of the sentence; for us, it is the mediating ob-
ject, the dispositif.”(Gomart & Hennion, 1999,
226)
Thus, here, the subject relates to herself and
transforms herself, not only mediated by con-
cepts or habits, but by objects made and used
as tools. And, with an explicit reference to
Gibson’s concept of affordances, Gomart &
Hennion expand on the idea of a reciprocal
transformative relation between the subject
and the object:
“Indeed, there is slow interpenetration and recip-
rocal enabling between procedures, skills and
properties of the object on the one hand, and the
ever finer capacity of the amateur to perceive
them on the other. (…) Only to an expert user is
there ‘pure’ heroin or ‘pure’ Bach. In competent
use, the propensity of drugs and music unfolds.
Expertise is not achieved, then, in spite of, or
alongside, the materiality of the object”. (Gomart
& Hennion, 1999, 238) 
The Fix
So, a second way to escape the dilemma of
voluntarism and determinism in the field of
drug taking may be to add the notion of ob-
jectification, or simply production. It makes
a difference if we take that opposition outside
of the body and the self, and we can do that if
activity is more than just a movement of the
body. The subject escapes the dilemma and
transforms herself by producing.
Above all, perhaps, it may be that intro-
ducing a third term to mediate the subject’s
struggle with herself reduces the risk of han-
dling the dilemma by inventing what we
might call a ‘fix’. 
A fix is a ‘thing’defined simply and exclu-
sively as ‘that which solves the problem’. I
have borrowed the concept from political cri-
tiques directed at simple instrumental solu-
tions to complex social problems such as the
drug problem – and these critics, of course,
borrowed from the poetic slang of addicts
who used it to express the most instrumental
moment of their selves. In between those
spheres, the professional history of dealing
with drugs and substances misuse is full of
fixes too. Such as the cocaine which was be-
lieved to fix the problem identified, in the
second half of the 19th century, as morphin-
ism, or methadone a hundred years later, or
Antabuse in between 4.
A fix is different from a real tool in that it
is nothing more than the negative image of
the problem. It remains purely abstract,
imagined; or, to be more precise, it is only a
fix so long as it does. When it is realized –
when it becomes a real tool, an instrument, a
technology – it does a lot more, and much
else, than solve the problem. It creates new
perspectives and new problems. In the drugs
field, of course, that lesson has been taught
many times, by the unintended social conse-
quences of policies, as well as by the misery
in which so many addicts have found them-
selves when they had believed to be merely
having a fix or perhaps just developing a
habit5. 
4 The world of theory is no less familiar with fixes.
Regarding the theoretical problem of freedom of the will,
such a fix could be James’ concept of ‘habit’ (1950), or
Bourdieu’s of ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1977). These are con-
cepts with barely any content apart from being designed to
solve the problem. What is extra is the displacement of the
problem into the body, that is, into a substance which is
nondescript with regard to the subject-object distinction,
and which is, above all, never unfolded or articulated any
further, except in terms of its empty cyclic reproduction
over time. Thus, if we interpret Valverde’s neo-pragmatism
too narrowly and literally as a modest introduction of a
middle term of a kind everybody believes to know – since
she does not, as did James, envision a development of the
idea of habit in neuro-psychological science – her philo-
sophical intervention should be criticized as a fix.
5 The desperate-euphoric connotations of the word, far
beyond its instrumentalist etymology, convey this point
nicely .
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What has also been taught, though, is how
far teaching is from learning. Ignoring, and
thus confirming, for now, this last lesson, al-
low me to lecture on about how objectifica-
tion might do more than fix things. 
Here I suggest we learn from Elaine
Scarry’s (1985) account of objectification. To
Scarry, the social world we experience is
made in a process of objectification, a build-
ing of culture. Historically, this is a progres-
sive process that is constantly opposed by a
regressive counterpart: the ‘unmaking of the
world’ toward a purely negative existence of
the body in pain which characterizes torture
and war; the meaning of the latter being to
substantiate the corporeal reality of a power-
ful ideology. 
In what she calls the arc of creation –
which consists in the projection of human
needs into the creation of imagined objects
and the reciprocal working of the artifact to
recreate its maker – reciprocation exceeds
projection:
“An existing object, by recreating the maker, it-
self necessitates a new act of objectified projec-
tion: the human being, troubled by weight, cre-
ates a chair; the chair recreates him to be weight-
less; and now he projects this new weightless self
into new objects, the image of an angel, the de-
sign for a flying machine”. (Scarry, 1985, 321)
In that sense, drugs are real tools that trans-
form us and the problems we take ourselves
to have. Drugs lead us on from a ‘negative
power’ onto a ‘positive power’ over our-
selves; drugs mediate and thus recreate the
relation of the self to the self. Drugs, as ‘im-
mutable mobiles’(Latour, 1987), seem to be
the ultimately material tools for a technology
of the self, and they seem to be always pro-
jected as fixes but always realized unexpect-
edly as reciprocating objects. 
And no doubt, if we are, in general, to un-
derstand how we currently perform and
transform ourselves through both ethical
practices and objectifications, through creat-
ing and being recreated by material and so-
cio-cultural ‘dispositifs’, the industrial pro-
duction and mass consumption of various
drugs is an inescapable factor. Drug use is a
pervasive cultural fact, not merely, as sug-
gested by O’Malley & Mugford (1991), be-
cause its hedonism provides the flip side of a
protestant work ethics run amok, or because
its dependencies protest the vanity of our be-
lief in autonomy, as its sedations and depres-
sions mock our ravings about an active soci-
ety, but also, more simply, because the chem-
ically regulated body has become the norm.
The vast increase in the prescription of medi-
cine, psychotropic and otherwise, is accom-
panied by a gradual transformation of foods
and drinks into ‘functional’ instruments of
health, and of sports into the engineered
building of bodies. The process of medical-
ization is quite tangible; we have become
medicated medicators.
This is why it may make some sense to
turn Marx’ phrase on religion on its back.
Marx used the metaphor of the very simple
mechanism of sedation to point to the materi-
al workings of that very complicated phe-
nomenon of religion. As his early writings
and his critique of Feuerbach’s materialist
analysis of religion testify, this was not the
result of a simple reductionism; but it was
probably out of a wish to ‘cut the crap’ and
return to the brutal basics as an approach to
‘spiritual’ matters. If we can now say that
opium is the religion of the people, it is be-
cause those same brutal basics, in the shape
of simple commodities providing instrumen-
tal fixes for the needs they engender, have
come to rule the secularized world of the
New World Order. 
Scarry interprets (following the dialectical
tradition) religion as the ultimate artifact,
alienated, we might say, as the hidden oppo-
site of the fix: in religion, God is no longer
created by humans, God only creates. The fix
and the deity, the profane and the sacred, are
the two sides of the cycle (or rather: the spi-
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ral) of reciprocating objectification, broken
apart into a dichotomy in the process of alien-
ation. Perhaps we have taken a turn in that
cycle since Marx, so that the created Fix has
replaced God the creator on the throne of ide-
ology (an idea not far from what Marx actual-
ly predicted in the Communist Manifesto
(Marx, 1848)).
Outsiders or Insiders?
But – one could ask, of course – is the use of
drugs really something external? Drugs are
not only put back into the body, but also
thereby reconstitute the psychic functional
basis of the subject itself. 
Again, medicalization is tangible, perhaps
as tangible as one can get. We can reply, with
the cannabis smokers who were once asked
to comment on Howard Becker’s famous
thesis in his “How to become a marihuana
user” (Becker, 1963) that the high was not an
effect of the drug itself, but of learning cul-
tural cues and symbols – that maybe he
should consider finding himself another
pusher (Hall et al., 1977). It may be that those
effects have to be felt, and that their percep-
tion is culturally formed and learnt, but that
does not mean that they are necessarily mas-
tered, nor that they would be absent in other
cultural contexts. The drugs enter the blood
stream, affect the brain, and directly change
experience.
What could be more internal than that?
This is where it becomes necessary to dis-
tinguish conceptually between body, psyche,
and subject. As Butler argues, along a curious
mixture of psychoanalytic and Foucauldian
lines of thought, if the subject is seen to be
formed in a process of subjection, then the in-
dividual must be more than the subject, there
must be an original entity and a residual. The
psyche is the totality of the subject and its
dark side together (Butler, 1997). If we, on
the other hand, as I prefer myself, follow the
tradition of cultural historical activity theory,
according to which subjectivity is developed
in ontogeny through participation, we reach
the same conclusion: the subject is a contin-
gent quality of the human individual who
was born with a body that carries a natural
history of a billion years of psychic life. The
concepts of body and psyche extend beyond
that of the subject as features of individuality.
I even believe (as will be developed further
below) that we can qualify these approaches
further by understanding subjectivity to also
extend beyond the individual, and by thus ex-
ploring the consequences of the fact that the
constitution of the human individual as par-
ticipant-subject in a collective subjectivity
presupposes its bodily existence and death,
its limited scope and time, the urgency of its
needs.
Drug taking explores the relations between
the subject and the body. Intoxication is a kind
of experience that draws attention to the
fragility of human bodily existence as a mode
of realization of subjectivity. On the other
hand, drugs facilitate and shape our ways of
transforming or even avoiding that human
condition of pain, exhaustion and gradual
clouding of the senses which we have for so
long thought that we must be ready to face, in
the end if not before. With drugs, the individ-
ual subject regulates its bodily ability and
propensity for participation or separation.
With drugs, communities regulate the shape
of their participants, enhancing, inhibiting or
forming their participation.
And with drugs, the human individual
subject sometimes willfully surrenders, to
the effect of the drug in her bodily processes,
and perhaps thereby to other processes,
agents or collectives. 
Feigned surrender
Surrender tactics is another classical sys-
temic idea expressed in another specimen of
that combination of systemic and religious
texts, Jay Haley’s essay The Power Tactics of
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Jesus Christ (Haley, 1986).  Let us see where
such a bold juxtaposition of profane tactics
and the Almighty will take us.
Haley uses the Bible to speak for a notion
of a surrender tactics, a ‘negative’ form of
power. He argues that Jesus’ tactics of turn-
ing the other cheek is similar to a client per-
forming illness to control the behavior of her
family and others. And facing an overwhelm-
ing super-power like the Romans, surrender
tactics was probably the only feasible way.
According to Haley, though Jesus was the
most successful political leader in history, he
miscalculated the events of his last days. He
did not really believe that he would actually
be crucified. Hence his final bitter remark
about God having left him. But with religious
terrorists’ Kamikaze tactics freshly in mind
after September 11th 2001, it becomes
strange that Haley wouldn’t even let Jesus
Christ die of his own will. The contrast is ob-
vious and also makes one think of the fact
that in modern warfare even a handful of
dead Westerners is politically disastrous even
to the point of ending war: it may be that the
secularization of western cultures has finally
led us to give up the idea of the ultimate sac-
rifice. Regrettably, the political predicament
resulting from this state of affairs seems to be
handled with the fix of a technological shield
to make sure that all the victims remain non-
Westerners; it would seem that even after
September 11th 2001, the purging of death
from western self-consciousness continues.
The way Haley’s Jesus, like some of his
clients, (ideally) escapes death in the last
minute and thereby achieves power, makes
surrender strangely calculated and paradoxi-
cal, if not feigned. The really intriguing idea
in the systemic theory of the individual sub-
ject’s constitution, as a contingent element in
the social system of a family, seems to lead
Haley on the track to understanding self-sac-
rifice; but just before he turns around the cor-
ner to the most revealing implications, he
halts and leaves it open as a paradox which
then (contrary to Bateson’s paradox) collaps-
es as he retreats to the traditional autonomous
individual subjectivity of calculated “power
tactics”. To Haley, the temporary self-cancel-
lation of agency is really only the intentional
self-creation of the powerful subject.
Maybe Haley could have learnt something
if he had not, like so many prominent thera-
pists, decided that his therapeutic ideas do
not fit cases of drug addiction. If we enter
that area of the field where hard-core heroin
users are treated, we soon encounter the drug
scene’s proximity to death, and it seems quite
reasonable to ask, with Hamlet: why not take
the full step towards a notion of the subject
that allows it, not only to exercise freedom
working on habits, or to emerge while sub-
mitting to constraints, to be actively passive,
or to recreate itself in an arc of creation, or to
gain power by surrendering, – but actually to
dissolve, to die?
Allow me a small anecdotal diversion. As
a young psychologist working with drug ad-
dicts in the 1980’s, I was attracted to sys-
temic psychotherapy as an approach to sub-
jectivity that did not rely solely on the sub-
ject’s own dilemmas of habit and self-con-
trol. One client’s death, in particular, im-
pressed me as understandable in a systemic
mode. She was a bright 23-years-old who
since the age of 15 had indulged completely
in alcohol and later heroin. She appeared
very masculine and spoke a distinct working-
class dialect. But it turned out, not only that
she was from a high bourgeois family, but
also that she basically thought of her life as
part of that family from which she had practi-
cally been absent for the last third of her life.
The more she, reluctantly, engaged in the
business of her own life, the more did her
parents seem to emerge as the important peo-
ple to her, and the more did her blue-collar
masculinity appear to be an accurately per-
formed counter-image to the family’s self-
conception. Just before she left our institu-
tion for a deliberately staged lethal accident –
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taking an over-dose in a public toilet that
would usually be overseen by a guard who
would usually interrupt whenever cubicles
were occupied for too long – we had man-
aged, with some difficulty, to persuade her
and her parents to have a painful conversa-
tion. It became perhaps evident to her, once
again but more definitely this time, that the
only way to influence that family (i.e. her real
life) was from far away. And it dawned on me
too late that she had in fact been serious when
she had explained to me that giving up her
own life was an option.
This paradoxical phenomenon of a delib-
erately planned accident appears to suggest
another way in which Haley is rather ad-
vanced and trendy: he allows for the subject’s
skillful mastery, not only of influences and
passions, but also of risk. As in the cases of
the young woman and Jesus, it may end in
disaster. The image of a risk-calculating,
rather than simply intentional, subject makes
a genealogical difference on account of the
actuarial technologies that can be deployed
in prevention campaigns, counseling, securi-
ty measures etc., and the way these match so-
cial and life sciences increasingly based epis-
temologically on population averages, and
increasingly tuned to managing specific con-
tingencies of ever finer-grained sub-popula-
tions (Rose, 1999; 2001). It may also make
an ideological difference by providing a way
of masking the ultimately existential fact of
death with the radically anonymous play of
numbers.
But there is a ‘rub’, as Hamlet says: when
risks and stakes become as high as with this
young woman, or with Jesus, the image of
the competent risk calculator breaks down.
That is perhaps why the scenes in the film
Deer Hunter where the Vietnam veteran hero
prefers to make a living by playing Russian
roulette for bets, rather than going back to his
safe but meaningless USA, make such an im-
pression. It is ‘risk society’ taken to such an
absurd extreme that it reveals our struggle to
avoid facing our mortality just behind the
screen of controlled eventualities. 
At this point, there is a need to probe just a
level deeper. 
Resurrection
The dialectics in the systemic notion of para-
doxes is a weak or incomplete version of the
dialectics of the subject coming from Hegel
(1968; 1988). In the Hegelian account of sub-
jectivity, according to Taylor (1975), the
myth of Jesus is the story of subjectivity, but
it is quite the opposite story of Haley’s. The
necessary incarnation of infinite Spirit in fi-
nite subjects places the equally unavoidable
death at the core of what it means to be a sub-
ject, and resurrection is the imaginary form
of this re-realization of the unity and resolu-
tion of the contradiction of mortal spiritual
life. Thus, the idea of resurrection, of reunit-
ing through dissolution, is a fix, in the sense
that it is directly identical with the empty
negative abstractness of death; it is not the
transformation of death, but death seen from
another angle. The true transformation of
death lies in the self-unfolding of Spirit for
which it is the vehicle, not in the image of
some eternal ecstasy in Paradise for the indi-
vidual.
According to Zizek (1993), this is closely
connected to Hegel’s and his dialectical fol-
lowers’ understanding that freedom is not, af-
ter all, opposed to determination, but already
implied in it, and vice versa. This, to Zizek
(and to Butler, 1997, both based on Lacan), is
not only a ‘logical’, but a profoundly ‘existen-
tial’point: it is the double bind that constitutes
the subject. The subject must set herself
against the dependency that founded her,
thereby denying her constitution, desperately
resisting – while at the same time uncon-
sciously pursuing – her own dissolution.
From this angle, some kinds of drug use may
be seen as yielding to that drive towards a dis-
solution that promises the fix of resurrection.
Outlines-2002-2.qxd  30-01-2003  11:38  Side 48
49
OUTLINES • No. 2 • 2002
But if the addict’s fix is another, curiously
commodified, form of the fix of resurrection
– an imaginary reunification with Spirit
through the dissolution of subjectivity – what
exactly is Spirit, in this context, in the age of
the Fix, of the brutal basics that Marx substi-
tuted for Hegel’s idealism? Even if Spirit is in
a sense as imaginary as resurrection, that
does not mean that it is simply non-existent
and should be banned from our texts, but,
rather, that it is, at least potentially, as real as
the Realabstraktion of money value (as in
Marx’ anticipation of the so-called ‘Thomas
Theorem’6 with his emphasis on the social
reality of imagined values and imagined
Gods alike (cf. Ilyenkov, 1977, ch. 7). And,
further, it leads to the idea that, after all, there
may be a fourth kind of escape from the
dilemma of freedom and determination – be-
side habits, objectifications, and death: that
of the subject’s dissolving, not in the negative
sense of giving up, but in the positive sense
of merging into something larger which must
not necessarily remain imaginary, something
which may emerge from and transform the
fix of resurrection, returning to reconstitute
the subject in an arc of creation in Scarry’s
sense.
The High and the Power
As I already mentioned above, that idea is not
far from the drugs discourse. Bateson’s
(1972) analysis explicitly refers to a process
of surrendering to a Higher Power. While
fighting the bottle means a false autonomy,
the subject is reborn, so to speak, through dis-
solution into the Higher Power of the AA
community – a surrender that may be at first
feigned, but is subsequently realized: “fake it
till you make it”. Probing into this notion of a
Higher Power may lead us further in our
search for a better understanding of the sub-
jectivity of drug taking. 
The AA was the first great self-help move-
ment of the 20th century, clearly based on the
confessional ethics of the Oxford movement,
but equally clearly distancing itself from reli-
gious temperance movements. It can be
placed at an intersection as both very modern
and rather antiquated, in fact even ancient. 
In Bateson’s version, it strikes us as mod-
ern. At about the time when Bateson’s work
was published, the idea of a surrender that
was neither feigned nor lethal was curiously
fashionable. This was when the late George
Harrison sang: “Turn off your mind, relax
and float downstream – it is not dying”. This
was at the time when Paul Willis reported
young cannabis and psychedelic drug users’
philosophy to be that real independence lies
in realizing that one is absolutely un-free
(Willis, 1976). There is a distinct New Age
tone to this indistinct Higher Power, and we
may thus suggest that it is something to do
with the (late, radical, post-) modern condi-
tion.
On the other hand, we can trace these fig-
ures of thought a long way back into religious
philosophy. A suitable reference here could
be Søren Kierkegaard (Kierkegaard, 1980).
He will help us locate our discussion both in
the continuity of theological thought, and, as
a student of Hegel, in contrast to the dialecti-
cal philosophy of the subject that was to be
taken in other directions by Marx and others. 
Kierkegaard’s idea of the self is of a rela-
tionship that relates to itself and, in relating
to itself, relates to Another. That idea is ex-
plicitly normative, as Kierkegaard discusses
the forms of sinful deviance, the so-called
‘despair’, against the ideal as a clear formula: 
“The formula that describes the state of the self
when despair is completely rooted out is this: in
relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself,
the self rests transparently in the power that es-
tablished it.” (Ibid, 14)
So, to Kierkegaard, one can – and should –
rest, or base oneself, visibly and clearly in the6 “What men perceive as real is real in its consequences”
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positing, or foundational, power in order to
be realized as oneself. And if one form of de-
spair, or sin, lies in wanting to be oneself in a
false way, another form of despair is not
wanting to be oneself. On this latter form, the
so-called feminine form (ibid., 49), which,
when self-conscious, is the form of weakness
that comes closest to suicide, Kierkegaard
gives us what almost amounts to a psycho-
logical description of drug dependence, and
ex negativo we even get the prescription of a
kind of surrender:
“In despair it cannot forget this weakness; it hates
itself in a way, will not in faith humble itself un-
der its weakness in order thereby to recover itself
– no, in despair it does not wish, so to speak, to
hear anything about itself, does not itself know
anything to say. Nor is there any question of be-
ing helped by forgetting, or of slipping, by means
of forgetting, into the category of the spiritless.”
(Ibid, 62)
It seems that Kierkegaard, a century before
the AA and Bateson, struck the idea of recov-
ery through self-humiliation to weakness and
thereby to a Higher Power. 
But this is not all. We can trace similar
ideas much further back in religious history:
Foucault found the idea that false autonomy
engenders loss of self-control already in
Augustine’s (354-430) writing on the prob-
lem of lust:
“He (Adam) rose up against God with his first
sin; he tried to escape God’s will and to acquire a
will of his own, ignoring the fact that the exis-
tence of his own will depended entirely on the
will of God. As a punishment for this revolt, and
as a consequence of this will to will independent-
ly from God, Adam lost control of himself. He
wanted to acquire an autonomous will and lost
the ontological support for that will.”(Foucault,
1997, 181)
Drug dependence, seen from that angle, is
one form of Nemesis, one logical conse-
quence of the sin of autonomy that has wor-
ried spiritual thinkers for two millennia. And
it makes sense that dependencies abound
when the cultural ideal is autonomy, as in the
late Roman Empire and in Modernity. 
Should we conclude that all this time reli-
gion is still religion, even if in this New Age
it is mixed with a certain alcoholics’ sobriety
or a certain hippie high? 
I suggest there is a huge difference.
Phrasing it as a sin is very different from talk-
ing of paradoxes, epistemological flaws or
square western values. And it would be a
grave mistake – in fact, Kierkegaard would
probably consider it a sin – to read Kierke-
gaard as just an early form of the psychology
we know today, with its free-standing indi-
viduals, interpersonal problems and inter-
ventions. 
When we travel from Bateson to Kierke-
gaard, we disembark into the times of Marx,
approaching, in his words, “the heart of the
heartless world”, while it was still beating. 
Now, in the New Age of the Fix, this hard-
ly seems appropriate. The Higher Power
Bateson encountered in the AA, the “God as
we understand Him”, was far from Hegel’s
all-embracing Spirit or Kierkegaard’s Power
that posits selves. As Valverde (1998) notes,
this is a very individualistic notion of some
guardian angel, often referred to as “my
Higher Power”. The inconsistency of surren-
dering to something one has simply invented
to suit one’s purposes can be seen as prag-
matically suitable to avoid the struggles that
would immediately ensue and split the orga-
nization if God were still something much
more binding and encompassing, something
over which participants could therefore dis-
agree (in the extreme, something they might
die for).
But if the AA epitomizes the “power of
powerlessness”, as Valverde claims, this
paradox is precisely the point where it goes
beyond the pragmatic spirit in which one
might be able to live with such contradic-
tions. The powerful surrender to a Higher
50
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Power cannot be merely the ‘small’ ethical
practices, the ‘tips and the tricks’ that oppose
monolithic notions of power with atomized
applications of serially generalized technolo-
gies of the self. If the Higher Power is disal-
lowed any unifying communal subjectivity,
both the surrender and its powerfulness are
reduced to instrumental acts and their effects
in readily commodified technological fixes.
And this is definitely not the whole story.
Even if the pulse of truly foundational reli-
gious powers has faded long ago, it seems we
still have a hard time escaping from the older
religious forms of understanding when we
dig into the dilemmas of freedom and subjec-
tivity deep enough to lay bare the question of
being and not being and its possible relation
to some kind of Spiritual Power. 
Imagined Communities
If there is, indeed, a need to follow through,
not just downstream with George Harrison
and the other New Age prophets, but on into
the much deeper tunnels of our foundations,
how do we deal with it? Faced with those tra-
ditional religious accounts of subjectivity, we
might, as we have seen, simply leave the is-
sue be and reject such idealist and fundamen-
talist notions of Spirit and God, like Haley re-
jects the resurrection of Jesus, or like Bateson
and associates neglect to mention their di-
alectical and religious forerunners. That
would be the sensible, pragmatic, modern
thing to do in a new age. That “pie in the sky
when you die” was a fix and may it rest in
peace. 
If only it didn’t keep resurrecting and
haunting us.
But there is also the option of following a
different path from Hegel – that of a material-
ist dialectics that does not, as is common,
read Marxism as an early sociology of
agency, taking subjectivity for granted as
given with the individual’s body, but rather as
an attempt to approach the enigma of subjec-
tivity in an epistemology of collective prac-
tice. In that approach, the religious monster
can be seen as an alienated form of society or
community. Thus, rather than merely remov-
ing the third term in Kierkegaard’s relations
of the self, we could suppose that some com-
munity of human beings is really the Higher
Power which posited the self. Or we could, in
Althusser’s (1983) terms, understand the
‘Ideological State Apparatus’ as the Subject
with a capital S who interpellates the small
subject in ideology. 
The problem, of course, is that it is not al-
together obvious that some abstract idea of a
community, or an Ideological State Appa-
ratus, for that matter, is any less of a fix than
that of a “God as we understand him”, or any
less a child of its time. Reviewing my argu-
ments so far, I am aware that I can be read as
building an argument for the kind of moder-
nity theory that laments the loss of founda-
tions and value-based communities and criti-
cizes the rise of a system world of instrumen-
tal reason. The feeble call for a ‘community’
just-like-the-ones-we-used-to-know may be
construed as just the abstract negation of in-
strumental individualism, to the point of hor-
ror where it converges with the addict’s ap-
peal, with religious suffering and charity, and
with Bateson’s and AA’s “God as we under-
stand him” to reveal themselves as manifes-
tations of the evil Fix they were meant to ex-
orcise (see Bauman, 2001; Rose, 1999).  
This seems the inevitable consequence of
pressing beyond pragmatics, in particular,
perhaps, in a time when ‘communitarianism’
and its operationalization as ‘community
psychology’, ‘community work’ etc. have re-
placed labor movements, world revolution,
and even welfare states as the discursive
counter-image to individualism. Community
programs may not quite be what we had in
mind to carry the real Higher Power, but it
seems to be all we have got.
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Radical Reality
Instead of accepting that we are stuck in that
dichotomy, condemned to alternate between
individualism and abstract communitarian-
ism, and arrange what Gergen calls ‘inhabit-
able intelligibilities’ for ourselves in it – per-
haps retaining memory traces of the greater
communities that we once wanted to wither
away – why not try, to break the vicious cir-
cle, the way of the ‘radical evil’ suggested by
Slavoj Zizek (1993)? The radical evil is what
most disturbs the ideologically ordered com-
munity; it is the never-ever that lies hidden
behind the always-already. Zizek’s method
(if we can call it that) is to set out from the
‘shadow’ side of each of the poles of an ideo-
logical dichotomy and proceed to reconcep-
tualize their interrelations in a transformation
of their presupposed common framework. 
Pointing to the radical evil, Zizek appears
utopian. He starts off from the counterfactu-
ality of the Lacanian barred subject, and even
refers to early Christian utopianism and men-
tions its contemporary radical realizations in
sects such as the ‘Sendero Luminoso’ as
starting points for reflection. Nevertheless, it
is my suggestion that this method can in fact
be understood as compatible with Valverde’s
and Jensen’s anti-utopian philosophies just-
in-time. The ‘radical evil’ function of the
Sendero Luminoso, for instance, is not the
utopian image of a universalization of its sec-
tarian principles, but what might be learnt
from its reality in the middle of a New World
Order. According to Zizek, it embodies a
combination of modern and pre-modern that
reverses the western combination of family
and market, making visible the disturbing
fact that the ‘modern’ logic of the market pre-
supposes the ‘pre-modern’ family and thus
cannot be universalized. 
The really provocative hypothesis is not
that a certain utopia can be realized if we turn
the world on its head, but that this is just what
we are already doing if we turn our image of
ourselves and our world, in certain respects,
on its feet again.
Theoretically, this would imply to follow
through the whole arc of creation to see in the
concrete how objectified communities of re-
alized power and instrumental pragmatism
might already be returning to remake us as
subjects, and how we may already be in the
process of recreating them. If this is viable,
we might identify a way of being and non-be-
ing, a form of self-transcendence which can
be seen to match, and deployed to replace, or
construed to interact with that involved in the
subjectivity of drug taking. 
A Bracketed Experience:
The Case of Anna, NA,
and Wild Learning
In order to make that point, or, perhaps more
realistically, to provisionally outline its fea-
tures, I need to interrupt my philosophical
speculations and return to my own business.
Among other things, it has been my business
to interview “Anna” in the course of my in-
vestigations on the interventions in young
people’s drug misuse in Copenhagen in May
2002. And I believe Anna can help us on the
way here (at least she helped me), since a
practical-empirical reference, even if it can
only be sketched in the framework of this ar-
gument, seems the only way to substantiate
the idea of a community as the reality of the
Higher Power. 
Anna and I both take part in the Wild
Learning network in Copenhagen which is
organized to enhance and reform the city’s
provision of services to young socially ex-
cluded, criminals, drug misusers, etc.7 Anna
works as a photographer and has done jobs
7 For more extensive descriptions and discussions of
Wild Learning and some of its predecessors, see (Mørck,
2000; Nissen, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000,  2002 a, 2002 b, in
press a, in press b).
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for the Wild Learning, among other things,
the photos at the website www.vildelaere-
processer.dk. She has also done odd un-
skilled jobs in educational and social work,
and increasingly she has been involved in
project activities with the social workers and
young people of the Wild Learning network,
often taking advantage of her skills, work-
shop facilities, and network as a photograph-
er. She considers herself an absolute amateur
in the field of social work and was surprised
and flattered to be invited to the monthly
meetings of one central network body in
Wild Learning called the ‘Lodge’ where
around 30-40 participants meet to discuss
various general or specific issues relevant to
this social work. But there is a part of Anna’s
background which both makes her more
qualified and, nonetheless, in a certain way
makes it more necessary for her to stop and
reflect before she thinks of herself as partici-
pant in the Wild Learning community of so-
cial workers: she is also an addict and a long-
time and very enthusiastic member of the
Narcotics Anonymous (NA), and she has
been doing a lot of ‘Service’, i.e. organiza-
tional work there. When at one of those
Lodge meetings Anna announced that her en-
counter with the Wild Learning network and
the young hash smoking people in and
around it had made her rethink the NA dog-
ma that there is no way to beat dependence if
you haven’t ‘hit the bottom’ yet (and young
people often haven’t), I leaped to arrange an
interview. 
Anna approaches me as an interlocutor
with just the kind of theoretical interest that I
have documented above; following the nec-
essary reservations that she does not repre-
sent the NA (since nobody does), she en-
gages readily in considerations on general
ethics, politics, methods – and art. 
Art is relevant here because what she tries
to do in her art photography is to provide a
provoking alternative to the prevailing artifi-
ciality of people’s self-presentation. Nude
pictures that are neither aesthetic nor porno-
graphic but aim to reveal a human being be-
hind the veil of self-presentation; a ‘scrap-
book’ of close-up images of her own skin
documenting her history with scars, burns
and marks; and everyday life pictures from
just before and during the first months of her
clean time. This is one kind of ‘truth-telling’
technology, then, which she brings with her
to the Wild Learning. Not that she thinks that
precisely the trope of ‘facing one-self’
through documentary photography is some-
thing a 16-years old confused hash-misusing
girl should be persuaded to do, any more than
engage in a 12-steps program. In Anna’s
mind, her art photography is special in that it
has no purpose outside of itself, and it is
strictly separated from her engagement in
Wild Learning. But we can identify a general
‘philosophy’ in it which also serves as an in-
terpretation of the NA experience and a
bridge to the Wild Learning.
“Interpretation” it is, for she is certainly
not simply constituting herself in the ‘NA
discourse’. She is that, but she is more, and
what is more is being produced in the inter-
view (among other places). I would say that
with this interview, she is coming to an un-
derstand of herself and with herself – this is a
process of Verständigung (see Dreier, 1999;
Holzkamp, 1983). Not because this interview
is very important in itself, but it takes part at
an important junction in her practices. I shall
return to that below.
First, I should let Anna speak for herself.
Explaining her more general ethical and po-
litical stance, she introduces a moral dilem-
ma of community care vs. self-responsibility
and concludes that she is perhaps a bit utopi-
an; when I then suggest there is a fundamen-
tal paradox in the AA/NA philosophy be-
tween surrender and choice, she protests that
conscience is not about substituting some ab-
stractly deduced principles for knowing by
yourself what is right: 
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So in a way it’s quite natural. That is, in the way
that – maybe I’m a bit Kharma-like, but it’s like, if
I do well, it must go well, it’s very simplified, but
there it is. Or Kharma-like: like doing things in the
right spirit, maybe there is not always a quick ben-
efit, but then on the other hand it’s done the good
way, and one can’t always see the result, you have
to have confidence that it’s all right. So, this way
one can make it, I can boil it all down to such quite
ordinary basic principles, because in fact I also
think that in our society one of the problems is that
people have to get quick results. Instead of think-
ing what are the principles in what I do, or what is
the idea behind it, they must have results kind of in
a hurry. I tried it often in Service, every time
someone would come in and say NOW we must
do a lot and ta-ta-ta. They come, and then they
stay for 6 months at the most, and then some of us
are left to sweep up all the broken glass after them,
because that’s not what it’s about. It’s about mak-
ing good- to build a good foundation, make some
good decisions and be persistent. And it’s often
like that, when people make a one-off project,
OK, cool, and then they just skate away, but if it’s
about building a society or building things in one’s
life, or building this organization to work well
etc., it is then that we must have confidence. We
need to do things the good way, and it will end up
all right. And in... that way you can transfer it,
that’s how I see the thing with the Higher Power,
to hand it over; – it’s that confidence which I hand
over. But the action I still have to do myself. So I
don’t see any paradox! (Laughs)
But that aspect about the free choice, that one has
to make a choice etc., is often the easiest to under-
stand, or that which matches the contemporary
spirit, or something, while the other side about
some basic values and a Higher Power etc., runs
against the tide, so to say? 
Well, not the thing with the Higher Power, be-
cause there is so much New Age
Oh, yes, that’s right. There is. Yes
But the problem is that, – listen: I have my own
views on this, OK?
Yes, yes, OK (laughs), I get it!
It is not – perhaps sometimes I’ve been – some-
times I’m angry about things that I think are
wrong or something. But it’s still only my opin-
ions, mind you, because it’s about what other peo-
ple do, and it’s not always very cool to be wise
about that. But it’s like – now that you’re asking,
and I do think this is extremely interesting to talk
about, because I’m never allowed, in particular,
unless I complain to some of my friends. But the
things that are easy to grasp, it’s the thing about
the choice, and that with some kind of – the self-
realization and the Higher Power and so on. And
that’s because you can buy a Life in the Light, you
can buy 10.000 tons of self-enhancement, or
“let’s-”, “new-age-let’s-realize-ourselves”-books,
and in – I think in most of them there’s a – again,
going back to what’s behind – there’s an egoistic
or ego-centered relation to the world, and that is
what the NA is not. Actually, if you read those
principles, it’s a humility towards the world, and
that is what I really love about this program, that
it’s a community, and it may be that it is more like-
ly a spiritual community than one of those old so-
cialist communities or something. But that humil-
ity is important. We can only do it if we do it to-
gether.
But what is a spiritual community, here?
Certainly not any kind of New Age fix. Not
even a community that is limited to dealing
with spiritual matters. Rather, it is to do with
NA’s form of engagement with real life is-
sues. It is about life or death, but it is de-
signed to remain precisely ‘about’ – strictly
and purely representational. In the NA itself,
it is an important principle that collective de-
cisions exceeding the founding principles
should not develop and cumulate, and that
even the sponsor’s advice remain just that.
Beside the organizational pragmatics, this is
also out of a pedagogical idea that people
only change of their own choice. But Anna
insists that all that does not or should not re-
duce collectivity, as it does not make truly
political considerations irrelevant. And that
leaves her with a problem. 
Anna’s problem lies at the intersection be-
tween the NA and everyday life as a whole.
Seeing clearly that a certain purism is the
only way to avoid the organization being in-
strumentalized or flooded by the kinds of cul-
tures that nurture drugs, how can she stretch
the ‘Kharma-like’ utopian approach to life
into the places and communities that matter
precisely because they are not as inconse-
54
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quential, and which constitute that life which
is dealt with representationally in the NA?
Among those are, of course, the manifold
communities of the surrounding society in
which NA members gain recognition for the
self-control they exemplify. Also, and more
directly, there is the way the NA itself func-
tions to facilitate an informal ‘lodge’ or net-
work that distributes not only advice, but also
resources such as jobs. Thus, Anna’s network
connections through the NA and through
Wild Learning significantly helped her on the
way to her current way of earning a living. A
third kind of community is even closer to the
NA, and as such problematic: a group of NA
members have organized a local drop-in cen-
ter that Anna once attended. But, as might be
expected, that place is filled with idle hang-
ing-out, careless flirtation, self-centeredness
and occasional dirty language. Anna is very
keen to establish, and works hard to main-
tain, that this place has nothing whatsoever to
do with NA. The NA, with its strict ethical
principles, is, and must remain, “just a kind
of meetings”, as Anna says.
Thus, the spirituality of the community
lies in the ways in which its foundational dis-
tinctness, its specialization, is established
and sustained with a specific kind of relation
and tension to the comprehensiveness of
everyday life. It is an example of the kind of
institutions that embody specialized princi-
ples which Agnes Heller – in my opinion
mistakenly, as we shall see below – takes as
characteristic of the state (Heller, 1981;
1985). In Heller’s terms, the specialized prin-
ciples, the so-called ‘objectivations-for-it-
self’, are distinguished from the heteroge-
neous ‘objectivations-in-itself’ of everyday
life, the productive use of tools, norms and
rules, and language of the ‘human-being-as-
a-whole’. Objectivations-for-itself are spe-
cialized ‘human wholenesses’ made accord-
ing to a definite standard, which may then
again return to ‘discipline’ everyday life as
‘objectivations-for-and-in-itself’. In this lat-
ter sense, the way the NA is ‘just some meet-
ings’ is connected to the way in which it rests
on Basic Texts and limits the identity it pro-
vides strictly to the category of addiction. 
But as we learnt from Scarry’s discussion
of objectification above, in the ‘arc of cre-
ation’ reciprocation (the reciprocal working
of the object to recreate the subject) exceeds
creation. When distinct principles are real-
ized in everyday life, a ‘cultural surplus’ is
continuously made which is troubling, and
even threatening, yet which also makes any
community that defines itself by those princi-
ples work in the first place. 
It may be that its proverbs and tips and
routine actions, which Valverde highlights,
insofar as this ethics is not confined to depen-
dency, also belong to that which reaches be-
yond and objectifies the more general spirit
of humble Kharma that Anna is so fond of.
But the ‘cultural surplus’ itself produces
much more of the powerful kind of commu-
nity that one can surrender to, – even if Anna,
follower of the Basic Texts principles, re-
frains from seeing it: the low profile of Anna
and her fellow faithful contrasts and obscures
the Higher Power. And on purpose. The
Higher Power rises in its might from the per-
sistent earthliness of its creators who fix their
gaze to the ground in order not to be blinded
by its light that lures into identification and
breeds a megalomania that destroys it. 
In other words, my suggestion is that what
Anna refers to as the humble Kharma, the
handing over of confidence, that is, the idea
of a Higher Power itself, points outside of the
NA to the concrete forms of community that
already exist to recreate and sustain the ethics
of the NA. Maybe Anna thinks of herself as
utopian, but that community which she calls
for, in a certain way, is already there. And she
is probably right – if I am right in re-/produc-
ing her thus – that the question is whether and
how that community is strong enough to con-
tain us if we face it and recreate ourselves in
its image. If we self-consciously assume the
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power it wields, where can we be trusted to
take it?
This could be a reason for Anna to resist
seeing herself as a social worker. One of the
most intriguing features of her account is the
way she pictures herself just at the barely le-
gitimate periphery of the Wild Learning
community. But when I probe into it, it turns
out that she is already deeply involved, both
as a photographer and as a social worker, and
has been so for a couple of years. She re-
counts a dozen current or recent jobs and pro-
ject activities of various sorts that contribute
substantially to the ways she earns a living.
Viewed as what one could call ‘local cul-
tures’ (Nissen, 1997), realized and materially
reproduced in varieties of groups, places, ac-
tivities and embodying a loosely circum-
scribed ethics, the NA ‘cultural surplus’ and
the Wild Learning overlap so that it makes
sense that Anna can be part of Wild Learning
without really knowing it. 
The Wild Learning is interesting here for
two reasons (besides the fact that it is my ap-
proach to Anna). 
First, Wild Learning is contrary to NA in
one important respect: it is social work of the
prototypical kind that deserves its name by
always transcending method by moving into
everyday life and by subjectifying (cf. Nis-
sen, in press b). Short of being a case of sheer
opportunism, it is as far as one can get from
basing on a Book and from the purism with
which Anna serves the survival and useful-
ness of the NA. The everyday cultural sur-
plus that NA had to always shove off is the
principle of Wild Learning. Still, Wild
Learning embodies much the same basic hu-
manistic values that purport to combine lib-
eral respect for individual autonomy and
self-responsibility with solidarity. Like the
NA, it often performs them in dialogical in-
terpersonal relationships based on experi-
ence and mutuality, and, perhaps above all,
on the idea that its pedagogical aims are em-
bodied in persons who combine the insight
from ‘having been there themselves’ with the
power of the example. 
Second, this feature of the Wild Learning
is possible because it is powerful. Unlike the
NA, it establishes a field of power and medi-
ates the ways in which social workers and so-
cially excluded youngsters are subjected to
and participate in a power that continuously
shapes the life conditions of its members and
those nearby. The ways in which it subjecti-
fies by interpellation are relatively transpar-
ent. In the final analysis, this is intimately
connected to the fact that it forms part of that
self-conscious powerful community par ex-
cellence, the state8. True, even here the medi-
ation of ‘doing good’with the way it ‘ends up
all right’ always transcends what any of its
participants can penetrate, and it always re-
jects any simple instrumentalization to serve
narrow purposes. But that does not mean it
rests on innocent confidence or blind Khar-
ma. In fact it is imbued with strategy.
The strategies in Wild Learning are of a
political kind. It is about reforming institu-
tions, services and provisions, forging al-
liances, opposing detrimental forces and
overcoming congealed structures, reaching
into both networks of social workers and of
young people at ‘street level’, working at in-
tersections where power is always precari-
ous. What emerges is a self-transforming
welfare service. The political strategies are
never simply ‘power politics’, or to be more
precise, abstract and self-sufficient power
politics is a pitfall that is repeatedly dis-
cussed and constantly worked over to avoid
8 That statement, of course, is a debatable point. The
concept of state is currently under revision under the im-
pression of recent economical, political and military
changes. Knowing that I am here, once again, on foreign
ground, I have sought to develop my analysis of the Wild
Learning community through taking part in an interdisci-
plinary research project about “Life modes and welfare
state at a cross-roads?” (see http://www.hum.ku.dk/lov/). I
have discussed a few of its arguments and implications in
(Nissen, in press a). 
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or confront. There is always an ethics that
points beyond. Political strategy makes sense
in terms of a generalizing recreation, not just
of certain distinct institutions, but, in the end,
of everyday life. This, too, is a feature not
only of Wild Learning as a kind of curiously
‘radical’ corner of the municipal administra-
tion in Copenhagen, but in fact, of the wel-
fare state itself: the welfare state being that
unstable kind of state that keeps transforming
itself to achieve social improvements, that is,
improvements in society as a whole (cf. Nis-
sen, in press b). When those social workers in
Wild Learning conceive of themselves as
critical toward the ‘system’, they can only do
so with a reference beyond the system itself;
yet this is the rule rather than the exception in
a welfare state. 
Finally, as Anna herself so graphically tes-
tifies on Wild Learning’s website, there is a
long tradition here of ‘cultural pedagogy’, an
ongoing and intended collective production
of objectified subjectivity, which, like art in
general, never quite leaves the participants or
the community be as they are. Juxtaposed to
the ways we thought we knew ourselves, cul-
tural artifacts perform and produce us anew,
just as critical and thus artificial as Anna’s art
photo that forces us to share her deviant his-
tory of misery, or with their insisting naked-
ness achieves a Verfremdung of the staging of
ourselves that we had long considered natur-
al. In this respect, the Wild Learning website
to which Anna contributes is much like the
numerous music festivals, street/theatre per-
formances, newsletters, conferences, TV-
programs, media events, etc. etc. which those
social workers over the years have success-
fully launched and made with the help or par-
ticipation of street kids/socially excluded
youngsters, bureaucrats, politicians, various
professionals, and researchers (including
myself), and which both have served to de-
fine and transform the identity of the commu-
nity and its participants.
To generalize: I have tried to convey the idea
that the self-transforming surrender to a
Higher Power may actually be done self-con-
sciously, but only in a roundabout way, as a
critical process of sustaining and developing
a powerful community. This indirectness, in
my view, is the key to a reinterpretation of the
idea that the subject itself is essentially coun-
terfactual and self-dissolving, what Zizek
calls a ‘radical void’. In the mediation
through the inter-subjectivity of the commu-
nity and through the objectivity of its recipro-
cating artifacts and of its societal embedded-
ness, the self-transforming subject passes an
impasse, a point that is logically incompre-
hensible and out of control when viewed
from below, from the participant subject who
is thereby reconstituted; and it is just that
point which makes it wise to substitute hum-
ble confidence for instrumental goal-direct-
edness9. 
Return of the drug
And drugs? Have we only achieved this un-
derstanding at the price of leaving the trou-
blesome issue of drug taking behind?
Actually, this would not necessarily be such a
bad idea. Perhaps the pair of networks or or-
ganizations that we have briefly considered
here only combine so well because they re-
main complementary in what they focus on
or avoid. It is a characteristic feature of the
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9 At this point, I dare to digress to an interpretation of an-
other contemporary artifact: the film Dancer in the Dark
by Lars von Trier (who is, by the way, himself both perma-
nently on anti-depressive drugs and a converted Catholic).
The absolutely revolting lack of any kind of welfare state
to mediate our compassion with the tragic heroine Selma
creates the stark dichotomy between the at once contingent
and preordained track of grim ‘real’ events that lead to her
self-inflicted death and the beautiful musical scenes in
which, as Selma sings “You will always be there to catch
me, when I fall”. The death sentence which is both entirely
unfair and totally asked for is here the direct opposite of
NA’s hidden substantial solidarity.
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Copenhagen social system (the ‘Family and
Labor Market Administration’) that its policy
on young people’s drug use particularly em-
phasizes not at all to focus on the drugs, but
on the whole social situation of the young-
sters. Sometimes this approach tends toward
a Kharma-like confidence that any drug
problems will evaporate of themselves if
only one ‘does good’ on the social situation.
‘Tends toward’, because as a generalizing de-
scription it would fail to do justice to the di-
alectics of City’s social policy which results
either simply from internal contradictions
and adverse political forces, or from that
combined with a truly dialectically reflected
strategy (cf. Vinum & Nissen, in press). 
But if we do, on this basis, approach
drugs, not merely as a symptom or a symbol,
but as an actual chemical technology of the
self that can be used instrumentally and has a
potential for recreating us as passionately de-
pendent, is there a way in which we can rec-
oncile Anna’s Kharma-like confidence with
the letting-go involved in drug taking itself
(like when we confidently undergo anesthet-
ics for surgery in the clinic)?
One way could be to suggest that it is pre-
cisely as socially produced technologies of
the self that the drugs and the NA’s adversary
to dependence, the repeatedly ritually con-
firmed abstinence, are comparable. The les-
son from the NA is the opposite of the tem-
perance movements in that the NA accepts
that we have lost our innocence forever.
Whether we, the dependent, are clean or
dirty, we are living with one carefully con-
trolled social technology of the self or anoth-
er, objectified in and reciprocating from one
sort of cultural objects or the other, with
chemical instruments playing one or the oth-
er leading role. The ‘radical reality’, that
‘radical evil’ which is already the pattern on
every wall-paper, is that the carefully con-
trolled bodily regime of chemistry symbol-
ized so acutely by the NA’s meticulous clean
time is even more pervasive than the simple
facts of literal medicalization, wet (alco-
holic) culture, or hedonistic youth; and that,
as a technology of selves, it is far from con-
fined to lone-standing individuals – it builds
communities and it is deployed by communi-
ties to recreate participants.
This ‘radical reality’ could be the key to
the paradox that the ethics underlying NA’s
strict but precarious restraint seems to match
well with that of Wild Learning’s perpetual
and often even intoxicated confusion on this
matter. Both ethics audaciously generalize it
as a feature of our culture normally pushed to
the shadows by the ‘drug problem’. This is
far from a colorful ethnography of some ex-
otic subculture, or a utopian image of a
‘drug-free (or drug-regulated) society’; it is
what we are already doing. If we want to not
only understand, and not even just invent,
ourselves, but to truly transform ourselves
critically as subjects of drug-taking, we need
both to be and not to be what we have long
since become: communities who produce our
participants and non-participants by regulat-
ing their chemical states over times and
places; and persons who build societies
strong enough to embrace our self-transfor-
mations, even when they are chemically me-
diated. 
The objectification of ourselves with
drugs, dependencies, abstinences, treat-
ments, institutions, and theories, are our con-
tingent instruments to do and to be just that,
and, with them or without them, we are likely
to “take arms against a sea of troubles” and
still “suffer the slings and arrows of outra-
geous fortune”.
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